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INTRODUCTION
n June of 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed dismissal of a suit brought under a provision of the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA")' because, the court held,
the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade ("CIT").2 The environmental groups that
brought the suit3 had fought hard to stay in the federal district
court on the apparent belief that the CIT judges' specialized exper-
tise in international trade and customs law would most likely lead
to pro-trade and anti-environment decisions.4 The purpose of this
Note is to demonstrate that such fears are unfounded.
This Note focuses on a series of congressional efforts to regulate
in the field of environmental law, beginning with the MMPA as a
prime example of environmental legislation that is inextricably
intertwined with United States international trade policies. This leg-
islation belies the notion that litigation in the CIT should come as
any surprise.5 Environmental concerns are increasingly recognized
as international in scope.6 Congress has thus repeatedly resorted to
its best weapon in the international arena-trade sanctions-in
order to achieve regulatory objectives in the field of environmental
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (1994).
2. See Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 509 (1994).
3. Plaintiffs were Earth Island Institute, the Marine Mammal Fund, and
David R. Brower. Id.
4. See infra text accompanying note 163-64.
5. See supra note 1.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
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law. Therefore, it may not only be proper but indeed necessary to
resolve environmental disputes in a specialized trade court.
To approach this topic systematically, this Note will divide its
discussion into three parts. Since a substantial component of the
inquiry is what may be the proper subject matter for a court of
"international trade," Part I will look at the history of the CIT and
its traditional caseload. In particular, the reader will be provided
with a jurisdictional context, including congressional enactment and
Supreme Court interpretation, with emphasis on the use and mean-
ing of the term "embargo." Part II will provide a substantive evalu-
ation of two separate environmental laws aimed at the protection of
dolphins and sea turtles, respectively,' and some of the litigation
that has arisen out of those provisions. This part of the Note will
describe a series of battles over not only what the laws mean, but
also which court should decide any resulting disputes. After com-
pleting this analysis, Part III will examine how the CIT has handled
the environmental cases that have so far come before it. This Note
concludes that the approach Congress has taken to protect the envi-
ronment on an international level will lead to an increase in envi-
ronmental disputes litigated in the CIT, and that this will in no way
disadvantage any environmental interests.
I. THE SCOPE OF CIT JURISDICTION
According to the Honorable Edward Re, former Chief Judge of
the CIT, international trade "is today the single common language
among all nations."8 Trade policy, therefore, is a vital tool used by
the United States in its dealings with other countries.9 Not surpris-
ingly, the growing impact on the American economy of internation-
al trade matters corresponds with growing numbers of dis-
putes-between nations, private citizens, businesses, and others.' °
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (provision regarding protection of dolphins); § 609
of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (Supp. 1990) (provision
regarding protection of sea turtles).
8. Honorable Edward D. Re, Litigation before the United States Court of
International Trade, 19 U.S.C.A. XIII-XLV (West Supp. 1995).
9. See id.
10. HONORABLE DOMINICK L. DICARLO, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE at i (1992). Judge DiCarlo is the present Chief Judge of the
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The CIT, as it stands today, is the product of congressional efforts
to equip the federal judiciary to deal effectively and efficiently with
increasingly complex disputes arising from international trade legis-
lation."
A. The History of the Court
In 1890, Congress created the Board of General Appraisers, a
quasi-judicial administrative unit within the Department of the
Treasury. 2 The nine general appraisers reviewed decisions by
United States Customs officials concerning the amount of duties to
be paid on merchandise imported into the United States. 3 As the
number and types of decisions relating to imports expanded, Con-
gress, in 1926, replaced the outmoded Board with the United States
Customs Court, a court established under Article I"1 of the Consti-
tution. 5 The change was little more than a change in name, how-
ever, for the jurisdiction and powers of this new tribunal remained
essentially the same, and the Customs Court continued to function
as the Board of General Appraisers had.' 6
Over the next thirty years, the Customs Court was gradually
integrated into the federal judicial system until, in 1956, Congress
reestablished the court under Article III" of the Constitution. 8
Despite this important change in status, the jurisdictional powers
Court of International Trade.
11. Id. at i.
12. Customs Administrative Act, ch. 407, §§ 12, 13, 26 Stat. 136-137 (1890).
See also Re, supra note 8, at XIV.
13. Re, supra note 8, at XIV.
14. U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8 (1). This provision reads: "[t]he Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the Unit-
ed States .... Id.
15. Re, supra note 8, at XIV.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. ART. III § 1. This provision reads in pertinent part: "[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." Id.
18. Re, supra note 8, at XIV.
1995]
114 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
and procedures of the court followed the pattern of its statutory
predecessors. 9 In the late 1960s, Congress recognized that fun-
damental changes were needed in the court's statutory procedures
as well as in its jurisdiction and powers.20 The scope of these
changes was so broad that, in the Customs Courts Act of 1970,21
Congress limited its efforts to procedural reforms,' deferring for
subsequent legislation issues of the court's jurisdiction and remedial
powers.
In the Customs Courts Act of 1980,23 Congress clarified and
expanded the status, jurisdiction, and powers of the former United
States Customs Court and changed the name of the court to United
States Court of International Trade.24 The new name more accu-
rately describes the court's expanded jurisdiction and its increased
judicial functions relating to international trade disputes.'
Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery, actively sponsored the Act,
19. DICARLO, supra note 10, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. 91-271, 84 Stat. 274 (1970).
22. DICARLO, supra note 10, at 2.
23. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
24. Re, supra note 8, at XIV-XV.
25. Id. at XV. The CIT consists of nine judges, appointed for life by the
President with Senate approval. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1994). Actions are generally
assigned to one single judge. Id. §§ 253(c), 254 (1994). The Chief Judge may,
however, assign the action to a three-judge panel if he or she finds that a case
involves "the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, a proclamation of the Presi-
dent or an Executive order; or [ ] has broad or significant implications in the
administration or interpretation of the customs laws." Id. § 255(a) (1994). See,
e.g., United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995) (Musgrave, J., concurring) (holding the "Harbor Maintenance Tax" uncon-
stitutional). CIT judges may also perform judicial duties in different federal
courts across the nation. 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1994). Although the CIT is located
in New York City, id. § 251(c), the court hears cases which arise nationwide. Id.
§ 256(a). The majority of customs and international trade cases, however, are
tried in one of the main ports of the U.S., such as Boston, New York City,
Washington, D.C., Houston, Dallas, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles. Re, supra note 8, at XVIII. "[T]he court is a national court ... ." id. at
XVII, and is authorized to hold hearings in foreign countries. 28 U.S.C. § 256(b)
(1994). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides appellate review.
Id. § 1295(a)(5) (1994).
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which he said offered "a vastly improved forum" for judicial re-
view of agency actions dealing with imports.26 Recognizing that
courts as well as litigants were often unclear as to the precise de-
marcation between the CIT and the other Article III courts, Senator
DeConcini was convinced that the 1980 Act would "eliminate the
considerable jurisdictional confusion" existing at the time and
would "result[ ] in uniformity without sacrificing the expeditious
resolution of import related disputes."27 Some of the main goals of
the Act, as stated by the Committee on the Judiciary for the House
of Representatives, were: (1) "the explicit grant of all judicial pow-
ers in law and equity"28 to the CIT as a full-fledged Article III
court, (2) the "re-emphasis and clarification of Congress' intent that
the expertise and national jurisdiction of the [CIT] be exclusively
utilized in the resolution of conflicts and disputes arising out of the
tariff and international trade laws,"' 9 and (3) the "transfer of ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the [CIT] for civil actions for the recovery"
of certain penalties or duties paid pursuant to the customs and trade
laws." When President Carter signed the bill into law in October
of 1980, he called it "a comprehensive system for judicial review of
civil actions arising out of import transactions and federal statutes
affecting international trade. 31
Section 1581 grants the CIT subject matter jurisdiction over
certain civil actions against the United States, its agencies and its
officers.32 The scope of the CIT's jurisdiction includes all cases
26. Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 126 CONG.
REc. 27,063, 27,064 (1980).
27. Re, supra note 8, at XIV-XV (citing 126 CONG. REc. 27,063 (1980)).
28. Id. at XV (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 27-28,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3739).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2183 (Oct. 11, 1980).
32. Id. § 1581 (1994). Sections 1581-1585 define the CIT's subject matter
jurisdiction. Section 1581 covers civil actions against the U.S. and its agencies
and officers, section 1582 covers civil actions commenced by the United States,
section 1583 regulates counterclaims, cross-claims, and third party actions, sec-
tion 1584 gives the CIT subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions under the
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, and section 1585 states that the CIT
shall possess all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon,
19951
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involving the monitoring and enforcement of international trade
agreements,33 the imposition of antidumping34 and countervailing
duties,35 and the classification36 and valuation37 of imported mer-
chandise for the purpose of imposing customs duties.3" Under sec-
tion 1581(i)(3), the CIT also has exclusive subject matter jurisdic-
tion over an action "that arises out of any law of the United States
providing for ... embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on
the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection
of the public health or safety . . . ." Congress used this language
in section 1581(i)(3) to redress the previous misconception as to the
seemingly overlapping jurisdictions of the CIT and the district
courts over cases involving certain import restrictions.'
B. Defining Jurisdiction Over "Embargoes"
Eight years after the enactment of the Customs Courts Act of
1980, the United States Supreme Court defined the scope of the
term "embargo" in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,4 1 a case involv-
ing the importation of grey-market goods. Plaintiffs, a coalition of
United States trademark holders, brought the case in federal district
court, attacking what they considered too permissive a Customs
policy regarding the admission of grey-market goods.42 The Su-
a district court of the United States. Id. §§ 1581-1585.
33. Id. § 1581(e).
34. Id. § 1581(0.
35. Id. § 1581(b).
36. Id. § 1581(h).
37. Id.
38. In a recent case involving the challenge of a decision by the Foreign
Trade Zone Board, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considerably
expanded the jurisdiction of the CIT. Conoco Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1994). For a detailed discussion of the implications of this case, see
Lynn S. Baker & Michael E. Roll, Securing Judicial Review in the United States
Court of International Trade: Has Conoco, Inc. v. United States Broadened the
Jurisdictional Boundaries?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 726 (1995).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (emphasis added).
40. Re, supra note 8, at XXXIX (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18, 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3759).
41. 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
42. Id. at 181.
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preme Court ruled that the federal district courts had 'federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, assuming jurisdiction was otherwise proper, in all
trade cases not consigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CIT.43 Thus, the district courts may not review embargo cases.
The Court held that an "embargo" under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) is a
"governmentally imposed quantitative restriction-of zero-on the
importation of merchandise,"" and that "trade policy is not the
sole, nor perhaps even the primary, purpose served by embar-
goes. 45
According to the Court, embargoes are imposed for a broad range
of purposes, including public health, safety, morality, foreign affairs
interests, law enforcement, and ecology.' As an example of an
embargo employed in the field of ecology, the Court cited a regu-
lation that prohibits the importation of sea otters and noted that the
CIT would have exclusive jurisdiction. In contrast, the Court
explained, mere "import restrictions" were not within the plain
meaning of the term "embargo," and as such, were not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT. Examples of such import restric-
tions were: permit requirements, tagging, licensing of items such as
milk, cream and other dairy products and inspecting products such
as meat.' The distinction thus drawn by the Court between quan-
titative and other restrictions as a measure of jurisdictional scope
ultimately became the key issue disputed in some of the cases that
are the subject of this Note.49
II. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
DISPUTES
In recent years, countries around the world have begun to realize
"that protection of the environment must be addressed on a global
basis."5 Thus, in the 1990s, the often different goals of free trade
43. Id. at 182-83.
44. Id. at 185.
45. Id. at 184.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 12.60 (1987) (prohibiting transportation, import,
sale, or possession of fur seal or sea otter skins taken contrary to statutory au-
thority)).
48. Id. at 187.
49. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 139-73.
50. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the
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and international environmental protection materialized as some of
the "most significant and contentious issues facing the international
community."'" To alleviate some of the friction between the two
areas of law, a large number of bilateral and multilateral treaties
have been agreed upon.52 In addition to international agreements,
however, the United States has used the "threat of trade sanctions
[as a] fundamental instrument of U.S. fisheries and marine con-
servation policy." 3 The following will examine two such laws 4
and the litigation in which a number of environmental groups chal-
lenged the Executive Branch's interpretation of those provisions.
Part A will explore the legislation that was passed to protect dol-
phins from the harm caused by tuna fishermen, while Part B will
study the law enacted to protect sea turtles from the dangers of
commercial shrimp fishing and subsequent litigation.
A. Dolphins v. Tuna
The prime example of environmental legislation that intersects
with trade law is section 1371 of the MMPA.55 When enacted in
1972, commentators called the MMPA "one of the most progres-
sive, far reaching pieces of environmental legislation ever draft-
ed."56 Acknowledging both aesthetic and economic value in dol-
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 717 (1992).
51. Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States'
Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other
International Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8 (1994).
52. Schoenbaum, supra note 50, at 717.
53. McLaughlin, supra note 51, at 7.
54. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
55. Section 101(a)(2)(C) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
92-522, 88 Stat. 1030, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (1994). It provides
in pertinent part that
the Secretary [of the Treasury] ... shall require the government of
any intermediary nation ... to certify and provide reasonable proof
to the Secretary that it has not imported, within the preceding six
months, any yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products that are subject
to a direct ban on importation to the United States under subparagraph
(B) ....
Id. (emphasis added).
56. Andrew Davis, Can we Save the Marine Mammals? The Deadly Decline
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, GREENPEACE, Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 11.
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phins 7 Congress aimed to protect "certain species and population
stocks of marine mammals [that] are, or may be, in danger of ex-
tinction or depletion as a result of man's activities,""8 in particular,
commercial tuna fishing.
Recognizing that spotted dolphins and schools of yellowfin tuna
travel together in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean ("ETP"),59
commercial fishing fleets find tuna schools by looking for dolphins
in the water.' The fishermen lay "purse seine" nets around the
dolphins,6 encircle the school, and trap the tuna by closing off the
net from below.62 While some dolphins are able to leap over the
nets, many are caught.63 These dolphins either drown' or are
crushed in the machinery used to retrieve the net.65 Discovery of
57. See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6), which states that "Congress finds ... that ma-
rine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great international
significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic ..."
58. Id. § 1361(1). "[Sluch species and population should not be permitted to
diminish beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant functioning
element in the ecosystem of which they are a part . . . ." Id. 1361(2).
59. See Thomas E. Skilton, GAT and the Environment in Conflict: The Tu-
na-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 458 n.23 (1993) (citing Margaret Palmer Gordon, Com-
ment, International Aspects of the Tuna-Porpoise Association Phenomenon: How
Much Protection for Poseidon's Sacred Messengers?, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 639,
643 (1977) and K. Patrick Conner, The Conversion of Starkist, S.F. CHRON., June
17, 1990, at 7/Z).
60. Id.
61. A process known in the tuna industry as "setting on dolphin." Don Mayer
& David Hoch, International Environmental Protection and the GA7T: The Tu-
nalDolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 198 (1993).
62. Skilton, supra note 59, at 458 n.23.
63. Some dolphins that are able to escape the net often return to take care of
their young only to find themselves caught in the net and killed after all. See
Mayer & Hoch, supra note 61, at 198.
64. As mammals, dolphins must breathe air. When they are trapped in the
nets, however, they can oftentimes not reach the surface in time to breathe and,
thus, must drown. Id.
65. Kerry L. Holland, Comment, Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use of Purse
Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 267, 268-70 (1991). Some dolphins
survive, but are severely maimed by the process. Stanley M. Spracker & David
C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free
Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 388
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the correlation between dolphins and tuna, combined with major
technological advances in commercial fishing equipment, led to a
steep increase in "incidental killings" of dolphins in the ETP, which
peaked in 1965 at 365,000 dolphins killed in that year alone.'
Prompted by a national outcry67 against these killings, Congress
enacted the MMPA.68
1. Legislative Framework
To limit these incidental killings, the MMPA regulates: (1) the
catching of tuna by fishermen subject to United States jurisdic-
tion69 and (2) the importation of tuna caught while using tech-
niques which result in an incidental kill of ocean mammals in ex-
cess of United States practices.7" The MMPA attempts to preserve
the Optimum Sustainable Population ("OSP")7 of marine mammal
species,72 and establishes a moratorium73 on the taking74 and im-
(1993).
66. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 61, at 198. It is estimated that about six mil-
lion dolphins have been killed over the last 30 years. Skilton, supra note 59, at
458 n.23.
67. See Tim W. Ferguson, Business World: One Entangling Edible in the
GATT Fight, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 26, 1993, at 8.
68. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994).
69. See id. § 1374(h), which regulates the issuance of permits and certificates
in general.
70. See generally id. § 1371.
71. Id. § 1361(6). According to 16 U.S.C. § 1362(9), OSP "means, with re-
spect to any population stock, the number of animals which will result in the
maximum productivity of the population or the species, keeping in mind the
carrying capacity of the habitat and the health of the ecosystem of which they
form a constituent element."
72. According to 16 U.S.C. § 1362(6), "[tlhe term 'marine mammal' means
any mammal which (A) is morphologically adapted to the marine environment
(including sea otters and members of the orders Sirenia, Pinnipedia and Cetacea),
or (B) primarily inhabits the marine environment (such as the polar bear); and,
for the purposes of this chapter, includes any part of any such marine mammal,
including its raw, dressed, or dyed fur or skin."
73. According to 16 U.S.C. § 1362(8), "[tlhe term 'moratorium' means a
complete cessation of the taking of marine mammals and a complete ban on the
importation into the United States of marine mammals and marine mammal prod-
ucts ......
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) defines the term "to take" as "to harass, hunt, cap-
1995] CIT JURISDICTION
portation of marine mammals and marine mammal products." The
MMPA provides that "it shall be the immediate goal that the inci-
dental kill or incidental serious injury of marine mammals permit-
ted in the course of commercial fishing operations be reduced to in-
significant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury
rate.
,76
To reach its stated goal, the MMPA directs the Secretary of
Commerce to issue regulations protecting dolphins and other marine
mammals.77 The National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), as
part of the Commerce Department, issues most of these permits and
certificates.78 The MMPA's prohibitions cover all takings within
waters under the jurisdiction of the United States,79 "except as ex-
pressly provided for by an international treaty, convention, or
agreement to which the United States is a party and which was
entered into before the [MMPA's] effective date."80 The MMPA's
provisions similarly apply to takings on the high seas by persons or
vessels that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
In 1976, a coalition of environmental groups challenged the au-
thority of the NMFS to grant permits and certificates.82 In re-
ture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal."
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(7) defines "marine mammal product" as "any item of
merchandise which consists, or is composed in whole or in part, of any marine
mammal."
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2). There are exceptions from the moratorium for
scientific research purposes, photography for educational or commercial purposes,
or enhancing the survival or recovery of a species or stock. Id. § 1371(a)(l)-(3).
77. Id. § 1362(a). The Secretary also has discretionary authority to issue per-
mits to groups or industries that qualify for exemptions from the moratorium. Id.
§ 1371(a)(1).
78. See id. § 1374.
79. Id. Section 1362(15)(A)-(B) defines "waters under the jurisdiction of the
United States" to mean "the territorial sea of the United States, and [I the waters
included within a zone, contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, of
which the inner boundary is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of
each coastal State, and the outer boundary is a line drawn in such a manner that
each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial
sea is measured."
80. Id. § 1372(a)(2).
81. Id. § 1372(a)(1).
82. Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297
(D.D.C.), affd on reh'g and modified, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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sponse, Congress amended the MMPA"3 with "compromise lan-
guage agreed upon by both commercial fishermen and environmen-
talists." 4 The NMFS clarified the meaning of OSP, proclaiming
that it describes "a population size which falls within a range from
the population level of a given species or stock which is the largest
supportable within the ecosystem to the population level that results
in maximum net productivity."85 Under the amendments, a species
is considered depleted when its number falls below the OSP or
when the stock is listed as endangered or threatened under the En-
dangered Species Act. 6 Based upon these new definitions, the
NMFS issued regulations and a five-year, industry-wide permit to
yellowfin tuna fishermen in the ETP, setting an annual "incidental
taking" quota of 20,500 dolphins.8 7 While the United States tuna
fleet made progress in reducing the incidental kill of dolphins,
many United States boats simply reflagged under foreign sails,8
avoiding the more stringent MMPA regulations.89
By 1984, Congress recognized that foreign fleets' were respon-
sible for most of the dolphin killing in the ETP, with a collective
killing estimated at more than 100,000 per year.9 In particular,
83. Pub. L. No. 97-58, 95 Stat. 979 (1981).
84. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 61, at 202.
85. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995).
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 is codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
87. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Opera-
tions-Permits, etc., 45 Fed. Reg. 72,178, 72,187 (Dep't Comm. 1979) (codified
as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (1981)).
88. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 61, at 203-04 (citing David Phillips, Statement
on Implications of the GATT Panel Ruling on Dolphin Protection and the Envi-
ronment before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Ener-
gy and Commerce Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (Sept. 27, 1991)). "In the
past ten years two thirds of the big United States seiners have reflagged with
foreign fleets." Id.
89. These boats carried few observers, were under no national or international
regulatory restrictions, and were not required to use the techniques for which the
United States had vigorously fought. Id.
90. These foreign fleets were from Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu, and
Venezuela. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, No. C 88-1380, 1991 WL
163753, at *2 1 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 1991).
91. Phillips, supra note 88, at 2. Estimates during 1989 claimed that the for-
eign fleet was killing five times as many dolphins as the U.S. tuna fleet. See
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estimates of the number of dolphins killed yearly by Mexican fish-
ing vessels vary from 50,000 to 100,000.92 Congress therefore
tried to "strengthen the requirements of the [MMPA] with respect
to documentation of compliance by foreign nations with the essen-
tial features of the MMPA."93 The resulting amendment placed an
embargo on tuna from any nation whose kill rates were above an
amount determined by comparison to the number of dolphins killed
by the United States tuna fleet.94 Since the United States market
accounts for as much as half of the world's tuna consumption,95
the strategy seemed promising.96 In 1988, Congress again amended
the MMPA97 adding three basic elements. First, Congress outlined
the kind of regulatory program that a foreign country must adopt
before the United States would allow imports of yellowf'm tuna or
tuna products.98 This eliminated the Commerce Department's dis-
cretion and inserted mandatory embargo language. 99 Nations wish-
ing to export tuna to the United States during the 1989 fishing sea-
son could not exceed two times the United States fleet's rate of
dolphin kill, and, during 1990 and beyond, national fleets could not
Holland, supra note 65, at 279 (quoting Animal Rights: Heinz, Purina, and All
Canned Tuna, NAT'L BOYCOTvr NEWS, Spring-Summer 1989, at 105).
92. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 61, at 204 n.127 (citing K. Gwen Beacham,
International Trade and the Environment: Implications of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade for the Future of Environmental Protection Efforts, 3 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 655, 665 n.72 (1992)).
93. H.R. REP. No. 758, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 639.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
95. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 61, at 204 (citing John Godges, Dolphins Hit
Rough Seas Again, SIERRA, May-June 1988, at 24, 26).
96. Indeed, the amendment prompted several countries to require their fleets
to adhere to MMPA guidelines by complying with dolphin rescue procedures
used by U.S. fishing crews. See John W. Kindt, A Summary of Issues Involving
Mammals and Highly Migratory Species, 18 AKRON L. REv. 1, 56 (1984).
97. Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988). See also H.R. REP. NO. 970,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154. Before the
1988 Amendments, tuna had been embargoed from the Congo, El Salvador, Peru,
Senegal, Spain, and the Soviet Union. Steve Charnovitz, Trade and the Environ-
ment: The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L.
475, 479 n.19 (1992).
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
99. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(C).
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exceed 1.25 times the U.S. rate."°
Second, Congress imposed a secondary embargo on yellowf'm
tuna or tuna products from intermediary nations that imported those
products from nations banned under the primary embargo. Coun-
tries under a primary embargo are not allowed under the amend-
ments to export such products directly to the United States1"' and,
thus, may try to circumvent the laws of the United States by ship-
ping their goods through intermediary countries. Third, Congress
required the Secretary of Commerce, within six months after the
imposition of an import ban on a country's yellowfin tuna or tuna
products, to certify the imposition of that ban to the President.0 2
This certification process is significant because it qualifies as a cer-
tification under the Pelly Amendment 3 and thus can lead to an
import ban on all fish and wildlife and related offending products."
100. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
101. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(C). "[Wihenever the U.S. imposes a primary embargo,
other nations that export tuna and tuna products to the United States must certify
to the Secretary of Commerce that they have also banned the importation of these
'tainted' goods." Skilton, supra note 59, at 459.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D). .
103. See, e.g., infra note 251. Certification triggers the applicability of the
Pelly Amendment (Section 8(a) of the Fishermen's Protective: Act of 1967, 22
U.S.C. § 1971-1980 (1994)), which grants the President authority to embargo all
fish or wildlife products from the country in question "for such duration as the
President determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanc-
tioned by the GATT." 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1994).
104. In October of 1992, Congress also passed the International Dolphin Con-
servation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523 (1992), 106 Stat. 3425, codified at 16
U.S.C.' §§ 1411-1418 (1994), granting the Secretary of State authority to "enter
into international agreements" to instate a global moratorium of at least five years
duration -prohibiting tuna harvesting through the use of purse seine nets that cap-
ture marine mammals. The policy is to "ensure that the market of the United.,
States does not act as an incentive to the harvest of tuna caught ... with dol-
phins" or by using driftnets. 16 U.S.C. § 1411(b)(3).
'Also in 1992, Congress passed the Dolphin Protection Consumer Informa-
tion Act ("DPCIA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994), which states in pertinent part:(d)'Labeling Standard
(1), It is' a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission -Act
for any producer, importer, 'exporter, distributor, or seller of any tuna.
product that is exported from or offered for sale in the United States,
to include on the label of that product the term "Dolphin Safe" or any
other term or symbol that falsely claims or suggests that the tuna
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2. Resolving Disputes
By 1990, the Secretary had not issued the comparability findings
required by the MMPA to show importing countries had either
complied or failed to comply with MMPA standards. 5 Disap-
pointed by this lack of action, Earth Island Institute, a California
not-for-profit corporation, filed suit in 1990, seeking to enforce the
provisions of the 1988 Amendments."° The District Court for the
Northern District of California ordered an embargo on August 28,
1990.7 Less than two weeks later, on September 6, the agency
imposed the embargo that the court had ordered.0 8 The very next
day, however, the government made the required comparability
finding and lifted the ban concerning Mexico.3 9 Ten days later,
Earth Island Institute"' applied to the district court for a tempo-
contained in the product was harvested using a method of fishing that
is not harmful to dolphins if the product contains-
(A) tuna harvested on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet
fishing; or
(B) tuna harvested in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by a vessel
using purse seine nets which do not meet the requirements for being
considered dolphin safe under paragraph (2).
This legislation introduced the "Dolphin Safe" label, which is attached to tuna
products sold in the U.S. so that consumers may make informed decisions
about the tuna products they purchase. See 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1).
105. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 967 (N.D. Cal.
1990) [hereinafter Earth Island I-1], affd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Earth Island 1-2].
106. Earth Island 1-1, 746 F. Supp. at 964.
107. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, Notice of Embargo for
Yellowfin Tuna, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,367 (Dep't Comm. 1991). See also Taking and
Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, No-
tice to Importers, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,995 (Dep't Comm. 1991). On January 25,
1991, Mexico requested a dispute settlement panel under Article XXIII(2) of the
GATT. On September 3, 1991, the panel issued its final opinion in the case,
holding that the MMPA, in pertinent provisions, violated the GATT. Dispute
Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug.
16, 1991, reprinted at 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1607. See also Skilton, supra note 59, at
467.
108. Earth Island 1-2, 929 F.2d at 1451.
109. Id. The findings were required under 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (1989).
110. Plaintiffs were: (1) Earth Island Institute, a California nonprofit corpora-
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rary restraining order prohibiting the importation of yellowfin tuna
from Mexico, "' arguing that the regulation"' under which the
Secretary" 3 could reconsider and lift the embargo based on only
six months worth of data was invalid as contrary to the statute,
which requires embargo determinations based on a full year of da-
ta.",4 The district court granted this temporary restraining order
and later, at the government's request, converted it into a prelimi-
nary injunction."' Judge Henderson stressed that
the continued slaughter and destruction of these innocent victims
of the economics of fishing constitutes an irreparable injury to us
all, and certainly to the mammals whom Congress intended to
protect. Indeed, for those species now threatened with extinction,
the harm may be irreparable in the most extreme sense of that
overused term." 6
The court held that the agency did not have discretion to issue
regulations, such as the six-month reconsideration provision, that
are in clear conflict with the language in the statute and contrary to
its congressional purpose.' Furthermore, under the regulation,
the countries at issue could consistently "exceed MMPA limits for
tion, devoted to the conservation of the world's marine and terrestrial ecosystems,
with a membership of approximately 35,000 throughout the United States and the
world; (2) the Marine Mammal Fund, a California nonprofit corporation estab-
lished to "sustain and enhance the ocean ecology with an emphasis on the surviv-
al of marine mammal species;" and (3) David R. Brower, a resident of Berkeley,
California and a well-known environmental activist. Earth Island 1-1, 746 F.
Supp. at 966.
111. Earth Island 1-2, 929 F.2d at 1451.
112. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(viii), 55 Fed. Reg. 11,929 (1990).
113. Defendants were then Secretary of Commerce Robert A. Mosbacher and
Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas H. Brady. After succeeding Secretary
Mosbacher as Secretary of Commerce, Ronald Brown replaced Mosbacher as a
party defendant pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(1). Also defending were Dr.
John Knauss, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, and William W. Fox, Jr., the Assistant Administrator of the National
Marine Fisheries Service. Earth Island 1, 746 F. Supp. at 966. All defendants are
collectively referred to as "Federal Defendants."
114. See Earth Island I-], 746 F. Supp at 969.
115. Earth Island 1-2, 929 F.2d at 1449.
116. Earth Island 1-], 746 F. Supp. at 975.
117. Id.
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part of each year, yet never be subject to the ban."' 8 The court
reasoned that, because the regulation created an easy opportunity to
circumvent congressional intent, 19 the reconsideration regulation
does not give foreign countries the incentive to stop the killings, as
the Federal Defendants had argued. Ample documentation of its
"lax record of promulgating and enforcing standards for foreign
fleets" 20 led the court to conclude that the agency's programs
were not aimed at a more rigid execution of congressional poli-
cy.1
2
'
In 1991, the agency had still not implemented a single ban on the
importation of tuna. Earth Island again moved for a preliminary
injunction, 122 asking the court to enforce those provisions in the
statute that mandated a prohibition of tuna imports from certain
foreign countries until positive findings on the incidental taking of
dolphins were received. 23 Earth Island contended that the MMPA
and the district court's order of August 28, 1990, required the Fed-
eral Defendants to ban the importation of tuna from foreign coun-
tries "unless and until the Secretary of Commerce had made a
positive finding that the average marine mammal incidental taking
rate of the exporting nation, as of the end of 1990 was no more
than 1.25 times that of the United States fleet.' ' 24 The Federal
Defendants argued that the Act did not institute any rigid time lines
according to which the agency must make its findings, "and that the
timing of the findings is therefore a matter of agency discre-
tion." "' Therefore, according to the government, the agency was
entitled simply to issue a new regulation extending the deadline to
118. Earth Island 1-2, 929 F.2d at 1452-53.
119. Id. at 1453.
120. Id. The court quoted, inter alia, the following: "The national marine fish-
eries service has failed to implement these requirements adequately." Statement
of Sen. Hollings (referring to the 1984 amendments), 134 CONG. REC. S16,336,
16,344 (1988); "[tlhe administration has been inexcusably lax in implementing
these laws." Statement of Sen. Adams, id. at 16,341.
121. Earth Island 1-2, 929 F.2d at 1453.
122. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, No. C 88-1380, 1991 WL 163753
(N.D. Cal. March 26, 1991).
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id. at *3.
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March 31, 1991.26
The court found the data compiled by the NMFS demonstrated
that Ecuador, Mexico, Vanuatu, and Venezuela each had exceeded
the maximum allowable dolphin kill during the 1989 fishing sea-
son 127 and held that, pursuant to the Act, the Federal Defendants
were required to outlaw, by January 1, 1991, the importation of
tuna from those countries. 28 The court further found the Secretary
violated the MMPA by failing to make the proper findings and by
allowing the continued importation of yellowfin tuna from the four
specified nations.
129
In August of 1991, Earth Island filed another motion in the dis-
trict court, 3° this time seeking to compel the enforcement of the
secondary embargo provisions contained in section 1371(a)(2)(C) of
the MMPA."' While both parties agreed that this provision cre-
126. See Extension of Findings Expiration and Interim Final Rule with Request
for Comments, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,160-162 (1990).
127. 1991 WL 163753, at *2-*3. The incidental taking rates are rates per coun-
try in comparison to the taking rate for United States vessels during the same
period: Ecuador (1.4 times the U.S. rate); Mexico (1.58 times the U.S. rate);
Vanuatu (1.65 times the U.S. rate); and Venezuela (1.82 times the U.S. rate). Id.
at *3.
128. Id. at *4.
129. Id. at *5. The court harshly criticized defendants, stating that they "may
not negate the clear statutory intent through the regulatory process," id. at *4
(citing Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795,
802-03 (D.C. Cir. 1988)), and that "[i]f the Secretary believes the Act needs an
amendment, then it is Congress he must address." Id. at *5 (quoting Aug. 28,
1990 Order, 746 F. Supp. 964, 973).
130. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
[hereinafter Earth Island II-1], rev'd sub. nom. Earth Island Institute v. Brown,
28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir.) [hereinafter Earth Island 11-2], cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 509
(1994).
131. Earth Island 1I-I, 785 F. Supp. at 828. This provision directed the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to
require the government of any intermediary nation from which
yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to the United States
to certify and provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the
importation of such tuna and tuna products from any nation from
which direct export to the United States of such tuna and tuna prod-
ucts is banned under this section within sixty days following the effec-
tive date of such ban on importation to the United States.
CIT JURISDICTION
ated a secondary embargo, they did not agree on the scope of the
embargo. Earth Island contended that whereas the primary embargo
covered only tuna harvested in the ETP by processes failing to
meet U.S. criteria, the secondary boycott covered imports of all
tuna and tuna products from intermediary nations, regardless of
how the tuna was caught. 32 The Federal Defendants, on the other
hand, claimed that both the primary and the secondary boycott
regulated only imports of tuna harvested in the ETP in violation of
U.S. standards.133
The district court held that the clear language of section
1371(a)(2)(C) "applie[d] to any intermediary nation from which
yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to the United
States. ,1 34 The court reasoned that both Houses of Congress had
presumed that, the scope of the secondary embargo would encom-
pass the ban of all yellowfin tuna.'35 Furthermore, the court held
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C).
132. Earth Island 11-1, 785 F. Supp. at 829-30.
133. Id. at 830.
134. Id. at 831 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C)). According to NMFS regu-
lations, an intermediary nation is "a nation which exports yellowfin tuna or tuna
products to the United States, and which imports yellowfin tuna and tuna prod-
ucts." 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995).
The court held that ,
the secondary embargo provisions of the MMPA specify that in order
to overcome the statutory ban and export yellowfin tuna and tuna
products-that is, any and all yellowfin tuna and tuna products-to
the United States, every intermediary nation must provide certification
and reasonable proof that it has prohibited the importation of the same
products which are banned from direct export to the United States.
Failure.to meet these requirements subjects the nation to the statutory
ban which prohibits the importation of all yellowfin tuna and tuna
products from that nation.
Earth Island 11-1, 785 F. Supp. at 833 (emphasis added).
135. Earth Island I-1, 785 F. Supp. at 833. The court held that the only legis-
lative, history available discussing the scope of the secondary embargo supports
its interpretation of the unambiguous statutory language. Id. at 833-34. The court
quoted the House Merchant Marine Fisheries Committee as stating that
[t]he Committee strongly supports this proyision in order to prevent
embargoed nations from circumventing U.S. restrictions thus
weakening the effectiveness of U.S. law. The committee expects that
all yellowfin tuna and tuna products, including canned tuna containing
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that the decisive question was not whether a certain foreign country
actually imported tuna from a nation subject to the ban, but rather,
whether this intermediary country has provided the U.S. govern-
ment with a certification and proof of a prohibition on the importa-
tion of tuna that would be banned from direct export from the
harvesting country to the U.S. 136 Thus, the court issued the pre-
liminary injunction, ordering the Federal Defendants to cease the
importation of all yellowfin tuna and tuna products from any in-
termediary nation, until those nations obtained the necessary certifi-
cation, 137 and to immediately create procedures to enforce the pro-
visions of any secondary embargo pursuant to the MMPA.'38 The
Federal Defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing, for the
first time in the course of this litigation, 139 that the case had been
"decided by the wrong federal court" because, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3),'" the Court of International Trade had exclu-
sive subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.' 4'
3. Choosing a New Battleground
The Federal Appellants argued that both the ordinary meaning of
the term "embargo" and the legislative history of the provision
proved that the CIT was the proper court to decide the case. They
any yellowfin tuna, whether caught in the ETP or not, will be embar-
goed."
Id. at 833 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 30 (Sept. 23, 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154).
136. Id. at 834. The court furthermore held it was irrelevant whether a foreign
country did not import, or had stopped importing tuna banned under the primary
embargo or whether a private importer gave a certification of origin regarding a
specific tuna shipment. The only requirement of the MMPA is "certification and
proof from the government of the intermediary nation." Id. at 835.
137. Id. at 836.
138. Id. Recognizing the burden such an order might impose on U.S. business-
es who had already purchased tuna from intermediary nations, the court held that
the injunction did not apply to yellowfin tuna and tuna products already pur-
chased. Id. at 836-37. The order "appli[ed] to all yellowfin tuna and tuna
products exported after Thursday, January 30, 1992." Id.
139. Brief of Appellees at 12, Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 32-48.
141. Opening Brief for Appellants Secretary of Commerce et al. at 21, Earth
Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
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asserted that, while the MMPA itself did not use the term "embar-
go," all relevant players-Congress,"42 the Secretary of Com-
merce, 43 the District Court,'" the Court of Appeals,'45 and
Appellees themselves' -had been using the term in its "ordinary
meaning" to describe the MMPA's contemplated tuna ban against
intermediary nations pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C).'47 In
addition, the Federal Appellants argued that the Supreme Court's
analysis in K Mart' of the term "embargo" squarely fits the
MMPA's secondary embargo at issue in this case."'49 The Federal
Appellants asserted that "[z]ero is precisely the quantity of mer-
chandise - yellowfin tuna and tuna products - which embargoed
intermediary nations can export to the United States."'50 Appel-
lants further insisted that the Court had unequivocally rebuffed
Earth Island's view that an embargo has to facilitate a "traditional
customs purpose" to fit within the scope of the statute.'
142. When adopting the 1988 amendments to the MMPA, "Congress used the
terms 'embargo' and 'embargoed' to describe the intended purpose and effect of
both the primary and secondary tuna import bans." Reply Brief for Appellants
Secretary of Commerce at 10, Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6154).
143. Id. at 12.
144. The District Court for the Northern District of California, Henderson, C.J.,
used the term "embargo" throughout its decision in Earth Island 11-1, 785 F.
Supp. 826.
145. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case involving a similar
provision of the MMPA, used the term "embargo" repeatedly. Earth Island 1-2,
929 F.2d 1449.
146. Reply Brief for Appellants Secretary of Commerce at 9-10, Earth Island
11-2, 28 F.3d 76 (citing Plaintiffs' Pleadings and Reporter's Transcript of Pro-
ceedings, Oct. 7, 1991).
147. Id. at 12.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
149. Opening Brief for Appellants Secretary of Commerce at 22, Earth Island
11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
150. Id.
151. Reply Brief for Appellants Secretary of Commerce at 13, Earth Island 11-
2, 28 F.3d 76 (citing K Mart, 485 U.S. at 184, which rejected "trade policy" as
the necessary mark of an embargo). The Federal Appellants further claimed that
the exception contained in the statute was not applicable because the MMPA
embargo was unquestionably not meant to protect "public health or safety," but
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Earth Island, on the other hand, argued that the MMPA did not
impose an embargo within the meaning of the Court's decision in K
Mart, but rather "establishe[d] certain conditions precedent to the
importation of some types of tuna from some nations,"'52 other-
wise permitting the free importation of any kind and amount of
tuna. "'53 Earth Island contended that subsections 1371(a)(2)(B) and
(C)
require defendants to prohibit the importation of yellowfin tuna
unless the exporting nation first satisfies certain statutorily-pre-
scribed import conditions. In the case of Section 1371 (a)(2)(C), the
conditions include certification and reasonable documentary proof
by the government of the intermediary nation that it has acted to
prohibit the importation of yellowfin tuna from those nations
whose tuna is subject to direct import sanctions under Section
1371(a)(2)(B).' 54
Thus, according to Earth Island, the provision does not impose any
restrictions on the importation of tuna, but rather "imposes certain
congressionally-mandated conditions of entry."'55 Earth Island not-
ed that the Court in K Mart had ruled that the grey-market import
prohibitions "did not constitute embargoes,"'56 and pointed to the
Court's analysis:
Congress did not commit to the Court of International Trade's
exclusive jurisdiction every suit against the government challeng-
ing customs-related laws and regulations. Had Congress wished to
do so it could have expressed such an intent much more clearly
and simply by, for example conveying to the specialized court
"exclusive jurisdiction... over all civil actions against the [Gov-
ernment] directly affecting imports."'' 7
Earth Island thus argued that the Court saw a difference between
embargoes, which unconditionally preclude merchandise from enter-
rather to conserve marine mammals. Opening Brief for Appellants Secretary of
Commerce at 21, Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
152. Brief of Appellees at 16-17, Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 15.
157. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 188-89).
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ing a country, and import conditions,15 and asserted that the
Court's holding in K Mart was clear and unambiguous when it
stated that "Congress declined to grant [the CIT] jurisdiction to
review challenges to conditions of importation."15 9
Earth Island further contended that the Customs Courts Act of
1980,"w which introduced subparagraph (i) of section 1581, was
never intended to enlarge the court's traditional grant of jurisdiction
over international trade matters, but rather was enacted to clarify its
scope. 6' Asserting that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction over
cases "arising out of the federal statutes governing import transac-
tions," cases "involving classification and valuation issues," and
"antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, 1 62 Earth Is-
land claimed that
nothing ... in the legislative history, even remotely suggests that
the CIT has the authority or the expertise to interpret the Secretary
of Commerce's mandatory duties under non-trade statutes, such as
the MMPA, which impose import conditions to encourage foreign
nation cooperation in international environmental protection mat-
ters that are otherwise beyond the regulatory reach of the federal
government."
Thus, Earth Island argued that none of the issues in the Federal
Defendants' substantive arguments "bears any resemblance to the
questions of classification, valuation, rate of duties, or other trade
matters within the special expertise and traditional jurisdiction of
the CIT."' 64
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments and
dismissed the suit in a four-page opinion.65 Following the Su-
preme Court in K Mart, the court of appeals stated that the term
"embargo," in its "ordinary meaning," was a "government order
158. Id. at 16.
159. Id. at 20 (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 189).
160. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 23-27.
161. Brief of Appellees at 21-24, Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
162. Id. at 22-23 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 21
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3732-33).
163. Brief of Appellees at 24, Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76 (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Earth Island 11-2, 28 F.3d 76.
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prohibiting commercial trade with individuals or businesses of other
nations ... prevent[ing] goods from entering a nation and... im-
posed on a product or on an individual country."'" The court not-
ed that the term "embargo" did not "encompass all importation
prohibitions, but rather name[d] a subclass of importation pro-
hibitions," '167 and explained that an importation prohibition is not
an "embargo" if it only affords "a mechanism by which a private
party might ... enlist the Government's aid in restricting the quan-
tity of imports in order to enforce private rights."'68 The court
pointed out that embargoes may be imposed for a variety of "rea-
sons other than the protection of public health or safety,"' 69 and
that, therefore, Appellees' argument that an embargo must be root-
ed in international trade policy, was faulty.
Further, the court did not agree with Earth Island's interpretation
of the legislative history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980. The
court found that the purpose of the Act was to resolve the status,
jurisdiction, and powers of the Customs Court.70 The court reject-
ed Earth Island's argument that the jurisdiction of the CIT should
be "interpreted functionally" and should be limited to the court's
areas of expertise, finding it contrary to Congress' clearly articulat-
ed "jurisdictional line."'' Furthermore, the court pointed out that
the Supreme Court had already held that section 1581 "extends ju-
risdiction to all kinds of embargoes, not just those rooted in trade
policy or import transactions."'7 The court reasoned, therefore,
that any action brought under 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) against the
United States is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3). 73
166. Id. at 77 (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. 184).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (1988)).
170. Id. at 78 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3731).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 79. The circuit court vacated the district court's grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction, Earth Island H-1, 785 F. Supp. 826, and remanded. Earth Island
11-2, 28 F.3d at 79. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 14, 1994,
Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 115 S. Ct. 509 (1994), leaving the environmental
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B. Sea Turtles v. Shrimp
The Sea Turtle litigation has helped to further clarify the scope of
the CIT's jurisdiction as to claims containing environmental issues.
Much like the dolphin dispute just discussed, litigation involving
the sea turtle law has turned on the interpretation of certain interna-
tional trade statutes and regulations. Also, like in the dolphin case,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the CIT, a federal court specializ-
ing in international trade issues, has indeed the authority and proper
expertise to competently handle environmental disputes.
1. Legislative Background
Congressional regulation originated in response to a dramatic
decline in the sea turtle population.'74 Today there are only seven
species of sea turtles remaining.'75 Five of these seven species'76
are present in the waters off the United States coast between North
Carolina and Texas, showing large numbers of incidental killings in
shrimp trawls.'77 These five species are currently listed as either
endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act of
1973. 178
In 1978, the National Marine Fisheries Service commenced a
research project to develop a device that would enable shrimp
trawlers to leave sea turtles unharmed while incurring minimal
costs for the shrimpers. 79 By 1981, NMFS had developed the
Turtle Excluder Device ("TED"), a device that would free 97% of
the sea turtles caught in shrimp trawls, "with no loss of
groups with a tough decision to make: whether to refile the suit in the CIT after
years of litigation in the federal courts. As this Note goes to publication, Earth
Island has not filed an action in the CIT challenging the Executive Branch's han-
dling of the dolphin/tuna legislation.
174. Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg.
24,244 (1987).
175. Id.
176. These five species are: loggerhead (Caretta caretta), Kemp's ridley
(Lepidochelys kempi), green turtle (Chelonia mydas), leatherback (Dermochelys
coriecea), and hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata). Id.
177. Id.
178. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
179. 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244.
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shrimp.""18 In 1983, NMFS initiated a program to persuade
shrimp fishermen to use the TEDs voluntarily. 8' Nevertheless,
shrimp fishermen did not regularly use the TEDs,8 2 which
prompted NMFS to contemplate regulations ordering shrimp fisher-
men to utilize TEDs or to limit tow times to protect the sea turtles
at risk of becoming extinct.'83 On June 29, 1987, the Department
of Commerce issued such regulations.'84
Although substantial compliance with these regulations caused a
marked reduction in domestic sea turtle deaths, Congress felt that
further laws with the specific purpose of confronting "the global
threat to these species posed by the unregulated shrimp fishing
operations of foreign fleets" were necessary.'85 In 1989, Congress
enacted section 609, the "Sea Turtle Act,"'8 6 to encourage foreign
shrimp trawlers to use TEDs or similar methods in order to avoid
the accidental drowning of sea turtles.'87 The Court of Appeals for
180. Id. "Since then NMFS has modified its TED a number of times, making it
smaller, lighter and collapsible for easier and safer handling. The NMFS TED
also releases debris and unwanted bycatch." Id. The technology of the TED is
explained in detail at 52 Fed. Reg. 24,257-261.
181. 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244. Working closely with a number of industry groups,
NMFS delivered TEDs to shrimp fishermen and explained and demonstrated to
them how to install and use the devices. Id. at 24,244-245.
182. Id. at 24,245.
183. Id.
184. Opening Brief of Appellants at 5, Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 6
F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Earth Island III] (citing 52 Fed. Reg.
24,244-45). These regulations were implemented at 50 C.F.R. Parts 217, 222, and
227 (1995).
185. Opening Brief of Appellants at 5, Earth Island III, 6 F.3d 648.
186. Section 609 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
162, 103 Stat. 1037, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (Supp. 1990).
187. Id. At the time, the provision read:
(a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Com-
merce, shall-
(1) initiate negotiations... for the development of bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements with other nations ... ;
(2) initiate negotiations... with all foreign governments which are
engaged in ... commercial fishing operations which, as determined
by the Secretary of Commerce, may affect adversely such species of
sea turtles .... ;
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the Ninth Circuit described the Act as containing two separate and
distinct mandates.'88 Subsection (a) "requires the Secretary of
State to initiate negotiations with foreign countries to develop trea-
ties to protect sea turtles, and to report to Congress about such
negotiations. '  Subsection (b) "requires limitations on the impor-
tation of shrimp from nations that have not moved to protect sea
turtles." '' 9
(3) encourage such other agreements to promote the purposes of this
section with other nations for the protection of specific ocean and land
regions which are of special significance to the health and stability of
such species of sea turtles;
(4) initiate the amendment of any existing international treaty for the
protection and conservation of such species of sea turtles to which the
United States is a party in order to make such treaty consistent with
the purposes and policies of this section ....
(b)(1) In general.
The importation of shrimp or products from shrimp which have been
harvested with commercial fishing technology which may affect ad-
versely such species of sea turtles shall be prohibited not later than
May 1, 1991, except as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) Certification procedure.
The ban on importation of shrimp or products from shrimp pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall not apply if the President shall determine and
certify to the Congress not later than May 1, 1991, and annually
thereafter that-
(A) the government of the harvesting nation has provided documenta-
ry evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program governing the
incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting
that is comparable to that of the United States; and
(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by the vessels of the
harvesting nation is comparable to the average rate of incidental tak-
ing of sea turtles by United States vessels in the course of such har-
vesting; or
(C) the particular fishing environment of the harvesting nation does
not pose a threat of the incidental taking of such sea turtles in the
course of such harvesting.
Id. (emphasis added).
188. See Earth Island 111, 6 F.3d at 650.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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2. Litigation
Claiming the federal government'91 had failed to implement the
statutory directives of section 609, on February 24, 1992, Earth
Island Institute and Todd Steiner, the Director of the Sea Turtle
Restoration Project, 9 2 filed a complaint in the District Court for
the Northern District of California. Earth Island sued for a declara-
tory judgment, a review of agency action, a writ of mandamus, and
injunctive relief. The Federal Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on jurisdictional grounds before any presentation on the
merits.
The District Court granted the Federal Defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint on two grounds." 3 Noting that Earth
Island's claims under section 609(a) implicated the Executive
Branch's exclusive foreign affairs function under Article II, Section
2 of the Constitution of the United States, the court held that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the political question doc-
trine. 9 ' Regarding Earth Island's assertions relating to section
609(b), the court found that those "claims involve 'embargoes' or
other 'quantitative restrictions' on the importation of products into
the United States, which matters rest within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the [CIT] under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(i)(3) and (4)." '95 The
court dismissed the claims accordingly, and Earth Island appealed.
191. Specifically, the named defendants were Secretary of State James A.
Baker, III, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmen-
tal and Scientific Affairs Curtis Bohlen, Secretary of Commerce Barbara Frank-
lin, and Assistant Administrator of the NMFS Dr. William W. Fox, Jr. [collec-
tively the "Federal Defendants" or "Federal Appellees"]. See FED. R. App. P.
43(c)(1).
National Fisheries Institute, Inc. ("NFI") moved to intervene on March 19,
1992. NFI's motion to intervene was granted by the court on May 6, 1992. Brief
for Defendant-Intervenor/Appellee National Fisheries Institute, Inc. at 5, Earth
Island III, 6 F.3d 648.
192. The Sea Turtle Restoration Project is a venture established by Earth Island
Institute in 1989 in order to protect endangered species of sea turtles. All plain-
tiffs are collectively referred to as "Earth Island."
193. Earth Island Institute v. Baker, No. C 92-0832 JPV, 1992 WL 565222, at
*I (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1992) (Vukasin, J.), affd sub nom. Earth Island Institute v.
Christopher, 6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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On appeal, Earth Island argued that Congress could not have
intended to give exclusive jurisdiction to the "narrowly-specialized"
CIT through section 1581, "an obscure provision of the Customs
Court [sic] Act of 1980. "196 Earth Island asserted that Congress
intended for plaintiffs to have "full access to the 'specialized
expertise' of the U.S. Customs Court (now the CIT) and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit)" in cases involving "import transac-
tions."'97 Earth Island further contended that section 1581(i) "was
included as a 'residual grant of jurisdictional authority' to ensure
that other, similar import-related disputes were heard on their mer-
its." ''  Earth Island claimed that section 609 was a "non-trade
statute[ ] ... that incidentally impose[d] import conditions" to
facilitate cooperation by foreign nations in international environ-
mental protection matters. 99
Again, Earth Island urged that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of section 1581 in K Mart supported its position.2" Pointing out
that "the 'grey market' import prohibitions under Section 526(a) did
not constitute 'embargoes' within the meaning of Section
1581(i)(3),"20' Earth Island argued that, in this case, like in the
examples given by the Supreme Court, section 609(a) merely im-
poses "conditions precedent on the importation of certain shrimp
products from foreign nations, adopted by Congress to encourage
the protection of endangered and threatened sea turtles by foreign
fishing fleets., 22 Earth Island claimed that
while Section 609 imposes certain congressionally-mandated con-
ditions of entry on the importation of shrimp and shrimp products,
it in no way functions as a quantitative restriction on the amounts
of such shrimp and shrimp products that may ultimately enter the
country, and it certainly does not constitute an absolute embargo
196. Opening Brief of Appellants at 11, Earth Island I1, 6 F.3d 648.
197. Id. at 13 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 20
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3731 (emphasis in original)).
198. Id. at 13-14 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 47
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3758-59 (emphasis added)).
199. Id. at 15.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 16.
202. Id. at 17-18.
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of 'zero' on such products." 3
Earth Island again likened the import provisions of section 609 to
"the licensing, tagging and inspection conditions" in K Mart.
'2a4
Finally, Earth Island claimed that under Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Society,25 a factually analogous case, "judi-
cial review of the government's implementation of import sanctions
designed to facilitate environmental objectives is proper in the dis-
trict court. '2"" In Japan Whaling, plaintiffs questioned the Com-
merce Secretary's failure to "certify, 217 Japan for certain whaling
activities that decreased the force of international whaling stan-
dards. Such a certification would have resulted in an automatic and
compulsory "imposition of numerical import restrictions on certain
Japanese products."2 8 Earth Island claimed that if plaintiffs' argu-
ments in Japan Whaling had been successful the importation of
certain products would have been "directly affected ... in much the
same way that Earth Island's challenge -to the Secretary's failure to
properly certify the compliance of foreign nations under Section
609(b) could affect the importation of certain shrimp... from
those nations."2" Earth Island reasoned that the Supreme Court's
failure to question the district court's subject matter jurisdiction in
Japan Whaling meant that "not every civil action 'affecting' the
importation of goods" is within the CIT's statutory subject matter
jurisdiction.21°
The Federal Appellees, however, argued that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the term "embargo" in section 1581(i)(3) "squarely
203. Id. at 18.
204. Id.
205. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
206. Opening Brief of Appellants at 20, Earth Island III, 6 F.3d 648.
207. Certification of a foreign country under the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i)(1994), results in a reduction of that country's fishery
allocation maintained in U.S. waters. See Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consis-
tency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales,
Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 485-90 (1991).
208. Opening Brief of Appellants at 20, Earth Island IIl, 6 F.3d 648.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 20-21.
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fit section 609's ban on shrimp imports, contending that every
time the federal government prevents the importation of certain
products into the United States, this action comprises "an embargo
for the purposes of establishing exclusive jurisdiction in the
CIT. 212 The Federal Appellees asserted that the provisions of
section 609 did not, as Earth Island argued, "incidentally impos[e]
import conditions," but that the import "provision is the primary
enforcement measure and constitutes a critical provision of Section
609. , 213 The Supreme Court, in K Mart, the Federal Appellants
further contended, unequivocally stated that an embargo or quantita-
tive restriction ensuing from "non-trade related governmentally
imposed embargoes, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CIT. ' 214 The Federal Appellees pointed to the Supreme Court's
example in K Mart of a typical embargo found in 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.60 regarding fur seals and sea otter skins, and claimed that
this embargo based on "ecology" proved that even "conditions
precedent" to importation of shrimp under section 609 had to be
considered an embargo within the meaning of section
1581(i)(3). 25 The Federal Appellees argued that "[b]oth the stat-
utes and their implementing regulations prohibit importation of cer-
tain products unless the product was obtained pursuant to the prop-
er method. 216
Further, the Federal Appellees argued that Earth Island's reliance
on Japan Whaling was misplaced 217 because "no party to [that]
case raised an issue concerning exclusive jurisdiction in the
211. Brief of the Federal Appellees at 13, Earth Island III, 6 F.3d 648.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 13-14.
214. Id. at 16.
.215. Id. at 17. Section 19 C.F.R. § 12.60 states that "importation ... of the
skins of fur seals or sea otters is prohibited if such skins were taken contrary to
the provisions of... the act of February 26, 1944." Id. (emphasis added). This
Act makes it unlawful for "any citizen of the United States ... to transport,
import, offer for sale, or have in possession ... raw, dressed, or dyed skins of
sea otters taken contrary to" this Act. See Brief of the Federal Appellees at 17,
Earth Island III, 6 F.3d 648.
216. Brief of the Federal Appellees at 18, Earth Island III, 6 F.3d 648.
217. Id.
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CIT., 218 In addition, the Federal Appellees contended that the
facts in Japan Whaling differed in important aspects from those in
the present litigation. 19 In Japan Whaling, plaintiffs did not re-
quest that the court impose an embargo, but rather asked for an
order by the court directing "the Secretary to certify to the Presi-
dent that Japan's whale harvesting operations 'diminished the
effectiveness' of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling," thus making the imposition of import restrictions by the
President a completely discretionary act."
Finally, the Federal Appellees claimed that the legislative history
of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 did not support Earth Island's
argument.2 ' The Federal Appellees claimed that since the lan-
guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) was unambiguous as to the meaning
of the term "embargo" and Congress expressed no contrary intent,
the court was not required to examine the legislative history of the
provision.2 Alternatively, should one resort to legislative history,
the Federal Appellees pointed out that according to the legislative
history, section 1581(i) was a "'residual grant of jurisdictional
authority... [which] expands the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of International Trade,"' and that the enactment of such a
"broad jurisdictional grant" was to suspend the then existing uncer-
tainty regarding the boundaries between the jurisdiction of the
federal district courts and the Court of International Trade.Y
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Federal Appellees and held
that, under K Mart, the CIT had exclusive subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case. 2 It reasoned that Earth Island's interpretation
218. Id. at 18-19.
219. Id. at 19.
220. Id. at 19-20 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1994)).
221. Id. at 19.
222. Id. at 19-20. In construing statutory terms, "[if the language is unambigu-
ous, its plain meaning controls unless Congress has clearly expressed a contrary
legislative intent."' Id. (quoting Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of Na-
vy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1990)).
223. Brief of the Federal Appellees at 20-21, Earth Island 111, 6 F.3d 648
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. at 47 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3758 (emphasis added)).
224. Earth Island III, 6 F.3d at 651.
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of K Mart was misguided in two aspects.25 First, the Supreme
Court had rejected the view that section 1581(i)(3) referred only "to
embargoes arising out of trade policy."22 6 Rather, according to the
Supreme Court, "embargoes are imposed for a broad range of pur-
poses, including public health, safety, morality, foreign affairs inter-
ests, law enforcement, and ecology." '227 The court pointed to the
regulation prohibiting the importation of sea otters2 8 and found
that "[t]he similarity between that ban on sea otters, and the ban on
shrimp products in this case, undermines appellants' argument that
the subject matter of this lawsuit is beyond the expertise of the
CIT." 22
9
The court also disagreed with Earth Island's interpretation of the
term "embargo" and the description of the shrimp ban as an "im-
port restriction" or "condition precedent.2 3' The court explained
that the Supreme Court, in K Mart, did not find an embargo be-
cause "there was no governmental ban on importation. Instead,
private parties sought to enforce a private right with governmental
assistance." '' In this case, however, the shrimp ban "is clearly a
governmental ban" within the K Mart definition of embargo."'
The court also found that it was bound by its decision in Cornet
Stores v. Morton.233 In Cornet Stores, the court acknowledged the
Customs Court's exclusive subject matter jurisdiction regarding a
case in which an import duty surcharge imposed under the Trading
With the Enemy Act had been challenged.2 " The court ruled that
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988)).
227. Id.
228. 19 C.F.R. § 12.60 (1987). See also supra text accompanying note 47.
229. Earth Island III, 6 F.3d at 652.
230. Id.
231. Id. (emphasis in original).
232. Id.
233. 632 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981). In Cornet
Stores, plaintiffs sued the Treasurer of the United States to recover customs du-
ties paid pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act ("Act"). Id. at 97. The
court held that although the language of § 9(a) of the Act could be construed to
grant jurisdiction to the district courts, Congress had unambiguously given the
CIT the exclusive jurisdiction over customs matters, expressly denying the district
courts jurisdiction over "matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court." Id.
at 98.
234. Earth Island III, 6 F.3d at 652 (citing Trading With the Enemy Act, 50
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any conflict between the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs
Court and the jurisdiction of the federal district courts should be
"resolved by upholding the exclusivity of the Customs Court juris-
diction."235
In an illuminating dissent, Circuit Judge Brunetti argued that the
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to make any decision regard-
ing the claims made under section 609(a) and section 609(b).236
While Judge Brunetti agreed with the majority's interpretation of
section 609(b), he did not agree with the holding that the claim
under section 609(a) was not justiciable under the political question
doctrine.237 Rather, he reasoned, because the CIT has exclusive
jurisdiction over "any action against the government commenced
under section 609 . . . we have none at all. We cannot pass on the
validity, constitutional or otherwise, of section 609(a) in this
case."23 Judge Brunetti disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that subsections (a) and (b) are "entirely separate 'law[s] of the
United States."'239 Although the claim under 609(a) itself did not
request an embargo or other quantitative restriction, there was no
question that it "arises out of a law (§ 609) providing for embar-
goes or other quantitative restrictions."2" Judge Brunetti argued
that just as the CIT, in Vivitar Corp. v. United States,"' looked
not to each subsection of the provision at issue, but to the provision
as a whole, the court of appeals should, likewise, view section 609
as a whole.242
Judge Brunetti argued that "[tihis common-sense reading of
U.S.C.AyApp. § 5(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995)).
235. Id. (quoting Cornet Stores, 632 F.2d at 98).
236. Id. at 654-56.
237. Id. at 654.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3)).
241. 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade), affd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
242. Earth Island II1, 6 F.3d at 654-55. The provision at issue in Vivitar was
19 U.S.C. § 1526, which: (a) prohibited the importation of certain merchandise,
and subsection (b) provided for the seizure and forfeiture of merchandise import-
ed in violation of customs laws. Judge Brunetti specifically pointed out that this
holding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and that the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id. at 654.
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§ 1581 effectuates precisely the result Congress directed in enacting
that section in 1980. "243 He continued by noting that nowhere in
section 1581(i) or in that section's legislative history was there any
evidence that it granted subject matter jurisdiction only over distinct
claims specifically invoking or challenging an embargo.2" Judge
Brunetti understood the provision as granting to the CIT jurisdiction
only "over whole civil actions, not just particular claims," adding
that the statute was unambiguous.245 Moreover, he argued, the
majority's holding created an "unworkable" rule: actions under
provisions like section 609 "simply cannot be neatly separated into
embargo-related and non-embargo-related parts."2" Therefore, "it
is within the CIT's jurisdiction to decide whether there is a separa-
tion of powers question," and the case should have been dismissed
altogether.247 As will be seen in Part III of this Note, Earth Island
refiled this suit in the CIT where it obtained a favorable decision
on the merits.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CASES IN THE CIT
Despite Earth Island's apparent concern that the CIT judges'
expertise in trade matters would disadvantage environmental causes,
a review of the three environmental cases thus far decided by the
court does not bear that out.2" To the contrary, all three cases
243. Id. at 655. As authority, Judge Brunetti quoted American Ass'n of Export-
ers & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which,
in turn, cited S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., at 4-5. "Because the statutes defining
the jurisdiction ... are so intricate and because international trade problems have
become so complex, it has become increasingly more difficult to determine" if a
specific case is entrusted to "the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the Cus-
toms Court." Id. Judge Brunetti pointed out that the 1980 amendments sought to
change this situation "by clarifying the existing jurisdictional statutes relating to
the United States Customs Court and by expanding the jurisdiction of the Court
to include any civil actions involving imports and a statute .... which is directly
and substantially concerned with international trade." Id. (emphasis in original).
244. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729-3786).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 656.
248. As the date of trade publication, only three environmental cases have been
decided by the CIT. Interview with Eric S. Rothman, Senior Law Clerk to the
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containing environmental matters have been decided in favor of the
environment. The cases have turned on the reasoned and unbiased
interpretation of international trade legislation by the CIT. Further-
more, each of the cases was resolved within relatively short periods
of time, an added bonus for the prevailing parties.
A. Finnish Elks
In 1993, the Secretary of the Interior certified to the President
that Taiwan was "a country whose activities were diminishing the
effectiveness of international conservation measures." '49 This was
done pursuant to the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protec-
tive Act of 1967,"o which "permits restriction of imports of any
Honorable Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr., United States Court of International Trade
(March 20, 1996).
249. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 848, 849 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995).
250. The Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protection Act of 1967, 22
U.S.C. § 1978 (1994), reads in pertinent part:
Restriction on importation of fishery or wildlife products from coun-
tries which violate international fishery or endangered or threatened
species programs
(a) Certification to President
(1) When the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a
foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing opera-
tions in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effec-
tiveness of an international fishery conservation program, the Secre-
tary of Commerce shall certify such fact to the President.
(2) When the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior
finds that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are
engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any
international program for endangered or threatened species, the Sec-
retary making such finding shall certify such fact to the President.
(3) In administering this subsection, the Secretary of Commerce or the
Secretary of the Interior, as appropriate, shall-
(A) periodically monitor the activities of foreign nationals that may
affect the international programs referred to in paragraphs (1) or (2);
and
(B) promptly investigate any activity by foreign nationals that, in the
opinion of the Secretary, may be cause for certification under para-
graph (1) and (2);
(C) promptly conclude; and reach a decision with respect to; any
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product from countries which violate international fishery or endan-
gered or threatened species programs." ' ' The Secretary found that
while Taiwan did not have indigenous populations of tigers and
rhinoceroses, it nevertheless traded in the parts and products of
these animals in violation of the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).252 On
August 2, 1994, the President issued a Proclamation, "directing the
prohibition of 'the importation of fish or wildlife,... and their
parts and products, of Taiwan .. .
In October of 1994, Plaintiff Florsheim Shoe Corporation at-
tempted to import shoes made from Finnish elk skin and manu-
factured in Taiwan. 4 The United States Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice seized the shoes at the point of entry "as articles barred under
the Proclamation." 5 Florsheim challenged this decision,256 argu-
ing that the term "of Taiwan" in the Presidential Proclamation "ex-
tends only to products made from wildlife native to Taiwan." 7
Thus, Florsheim reasoned, the embargo only extended to products
made in Taiwan from fish and wildlife that was itself taken from
investigation commenced under subparagraph (B).
(4) Upon receipt of any certification made under paragraph (1) or (2),
the President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the
bringing or the importation into the United States of any products
from the offending country for any duration as the President deter-
mines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned
by the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade....
Id. (emphasis added).
251. Florsheim Shoe Co., 880 F. Supp. at 849. The Fisherman's Protective Act
of 1967 is codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1980 (1994). The embargo has since
been lifted. See, e.g., U.S. Lifting Trade Penalties on Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 1995, at A4, col. 6.
252. Florsheim Shoe Co., 880 F. Supp. at 849. CITES is published at 27
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975).
253. Florsheim Shoe Co., 880 F. Supp. at 850 (quoting Imposition of Prohibi-
tion Pursuant to Section 8(a)(4) of the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, as
amended, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (1994)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. Florsheim contended that "analysis of the punctuation and grammatical
construction of the Proclamation's primary mandate... restricts the scope of the
embargo." Id.
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the wild in Taiwan. 58
Chief Judge DiCarlo of the CIT disagreed. 9 He reasoned that
rules of punctuation and rules of statutory construction required that
the embargo "appl[y] to all wildlife products from Taiwan, whether
or not the wildlife used to make the product was taken from the
wild in Taiwan."2" The court held that the Proclamation's incor-
poration of the Lacy Act definitions26" ' and its import declaration
requirements262 "prescribe[ I that the phrase, 'and their parts and
products,' may include products of Taiwan made from wild animals
originating elsewhere." '63 The court further ruled that the design
and purpose of the Proclamation demand the same result. 64
The objective of the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protec-
tive Act and the Presidential Proclamation was to stop the com-
merce in endangered species, "whether or not those species origi-
nated in the home country." '265 The court pointed out that Con-
gress was well aware of the need to define the scope broadly when
it enlarged the President's discretionary authority under the Pelly
Amendment, expanding it from the power to prohibit only products
made of wildlife taken from the country in question, to the ability
to "levy import sanctions on any product" from that state.26 Any
other interpretation, the court reasoned, "would precisely excise the
very mischief the President sought to avert-to preclude Taiwan's
trade in rhinoceroses and tigers., 267 For the provision to be effec-
tive, the President's Proclamation must necessarily include all
products from wildlife; whether the wildlife is native to the certi-
258. Id.
259. See id. at 850-51.
260. Id. at 851 (emphasis in original).
261. See 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1995).
262. See 50 C.F.R. § 14.61 (1994).
263. Florsheim Shoe Co., 880 F. Supp. at 851-52.
264. Id. at 852-53.
265. Id. at 852 (citing letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the President,
Sept. 7, 1993, at 1)).
266. Id. (quoting High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, H.R. REP. No.
102-262(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4090,
4097-98 (emphasis added)).
267. Florsheim Shoe Co., 880 F. Supp. at 853 (citing letter from the President
to the Speaker of the House, April 11, 1994, at 1).
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fled country must be irrelevant. Finding, thus, that "the language,
design, and history of the Proclamation unmistakably define the
scope of the Proclamation as encompassing products of Taiwan
containing wildlife originating from other countries," the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant United States,
affirming the Fish and Wildlife Service's interpretation of the
phrase in question.268 Thus, within less than 5 months, the govern-
ment obtained from the CIT a pro-environment decision on the
merits.
B. Driftnets in the Mediterranean Sea
In Humane Society v. Brown, a recent case before the CIT, the
court once more demonstrated that cases involving environmental
causes are given the appropriate treatment.2 69 The case related to
large-scale driftnet fishing by Italian fishermen in the Mediterra-
nean Sea. Driftnet fishing is a means of fishing whereby gillnets
with a total length of 2.5 kilometers or more are placed in the water
and permitted to drift with the currents and winds in order to en-
tangle fish in the webbing.27 ° The nets' panels are made of non-
degradable plastic webbing 27' and placed vertically into the water,
with floats on the top and weights on the bottom.272 Driftnets are
nonselective, entangling all fish, marine mammals, and sea turtles
that cross their paths. 273 Many of the fish caught are not what the
fishermen using the nets target, and, thus, a very high percentage of
268. Id.
269. No. 95-05-00631, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 16, 1996) [hereinafter
Humane Soc'y III. See also Humane Society v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995) [hereinafter Humane Soc'y 1] (resolving plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and defendants' motion to dismiss).
270. 16 U.S.C. § 1826c(2)(A) (1994).
271. See Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 341 (quoting Compl. 12). Compa-
rable accounts are found in the report to Congress in support of adoption of the
Enforcement Act. H.R. REP. No. 262, Part 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Oct. 22,
1992). "Large scale driftnets are distinguished by their method of harvest, indis-
criminately killing not only non-targeted fish, but dolphins, whales, turtles and
seabirds." Id.
272. Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 341 (quoting Compl. 12).
273. Id. (quoting Compl. 9 13).
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the catch is customarily thrown back into the water.274 Moreover,
because the nets do not disintegrate, lost or discarded nets or net
fragments continue to "ghost-fish," ensnaring fish and marine mam-
mals as they drift aimlessly in the ocean.275
In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly issued a resolu-
tion, suggesting that states impose a "moratorium ... on the use of
large-scale driftnets beyond the exclusive economic zone of any
nation."" This recommendation was adopted by the European
2771Community... on January 27, 1992.278 Several years before this,
the United States Congress had passed the Driftnet Impact Moni-
toring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987.279 The purpose of
the legislation was, in part, to "'reduce the adverse impacts of
driftnets' in the 'waters of the North Pacific Ocean, including the
Bering Sea.' 280 The Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to
"initiate, through the Secretary of State and in consultation with the
cabinet Secretary responsible for the U.S. Coast Guard, negotiations
with each foreign government which conducted, or authorized its
nationals to conduct, driftnet fishing in those waters. 28 ' The Act
was amended in 1990.22 The Amendments included congressional
findings that "the continued widespread use of large-scale driftnets
beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation is a destructive
fishing practice that poses a threat to living marine resources of the
world's oceans. 283 The Amendments also declared Congress' pol-
icy to "implement the moratorium called for by the United Nations
General Assembly ... [and] secure a permanent ban on the use of
274. Id. (quoting Compl. 14).
275. Id. (quoting Compl. 15).
276. Id. at 342.
277. Now the European Union. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247. See also Humane
Soc'y, 901 F. Supp. at 342.
278. Council Regulation No. 345/92, O.J. L 42/1 (1992).
279. Pub. L. No. 100-220, Title IV, 101 Stat. 1477 (Dec. 29, 1987). See also
Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 342.
280. Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 342 (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-220,
§ 4002, 101 Stat. at 1477).
281. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-220, § 4006, 101 Stat. at 1479).
282. Driftnet Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 107, 104 Stat.
4441 (Nov. 28, 1990).
283. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(1) (1994).
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destructive fishing practices, and in particular large-scale driftnets,
by persons or vessels fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone
of any nation."2"4 The members of the President's cabinet were
instructed to "seek to secure international agreements to immedi-
ately implement the findings [and] policy.... in particular an
international ban on large-scale driftnet fishing. 28 5
In 1992, Congress enacted the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries En-
forcement Act ("DFEA"),286 pursuant to which the Secretary of
Commerce, together with the Secretary of State, was required to
issue a listing "of nations whose nationals or vessels conduct large-
scale driftnet fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone of any
nation. '2 7 The Secretary of the Treasury was instructed to deny
certain port privileges to large-scale driftnet fishing vessels and to
deny entry of such vessels into United States waters.288 Further-
more, the Secretary of Commerce was directed to identify those
states with nationals or vessels conducting large-scale driftnet fish-
ing and to apprise the President and the country in question of that
identification before January 10, 1993. 289 Additionally, the Secre-
tary of Commerce was instructed to repeat this identification and
notification procedure anytime after that date, "whenever [he] has
reason to believe that the nationals or vessels are conducting large-
scale driftnet fishing."29
In May of 1995, the Humane Society of the United States and a
number of United States and international environmental groups29'
filed a complaint in the CIT.292 The Humane Society's first count
284. Id. § 1826(c)(1) & (3) (1994).
285. Id. § 1826(d) (1994). The cabinet members were also directed to report
the results of these attempts to Congress every year, starting not later than Janu-
ary 1, 1991. Id. § 1826(e) (1994).
286. Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106 Stat. 4900 (Nov. 2, 1992).
287. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(a)(1) (1994).
288. Id. § 1826a(a)(2)(A) & (B) (1994).
289. Id. § 1826a(b)(1)(A) (1994).
290. Id. § 1826a(b)(1)(B) (1994).
291. Plaintiffs included the: The Humane Society of the United States, Humane
Society International, Defenders of Wildlife, the Royal Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals, the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, and Earth
Island Institute.
292. Plaintiffs alleged and the court agreed that the CIT had subject matter
jurisdiction over the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) & (4) and 28 U.S.C.
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alleged that defendant Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown had
violated DFEA293 by not certifying Italy as a country in violation
of the United Nations General Assembly resolution on large-scale
driftnets.294 The court agreed that the DFEA required the Secre-
tary of Commerce to certify to the President "each nation whose
nationals and vessels were conducting large-scale driftnet fishing
beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation," '295 but dis-
missed the first claim because the statute of limitations had run. 96
The Humane Society's second claim was that the Secretary of
Commerce acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act,297 by failing to identify Italy as a
violator of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on
large-scale driftnets.298 The Humane Society sought both prelimi-
nary and permanent relief. The Federal Defendants moved to dis-
miss this count, claiming that the Humane Society lacked standing
to sue. 99 The Federal Defendants asserted that the injury pleaded
must be "fairly traceable to the[ir] allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."3" The Humane So-
ciety argued that "illegal Italian driftnet fishing is causing immedi-
ate, irreparable harm to marine resources in the Mediterranean
Sea,""'' and that plaintiffs were personally and directly harmed by
large-scale driftnet fishing because it reduced their opportunity to
§ 1331. Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 345, 346. Citing Earth Island III, 6
F.3d at 652, the CIT stated that "judicial interpretation [of the Customs Courts
Act of 1980] has affirmed the exclusivity of this jurisdiction over an action like
the one at bar." Humane Soc'y I, 901 F. Supp. at 346.
293. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(f) (1994). The section provides that "[ilf at any time the
Secretary [of Commerce] ... identifies any nation that warrants inclusion in the
list described under subsection (e)(6), the Secretary shall certify that fact to the
President." Id.
294. Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 345 (quoting Compl. at 47).
295. Id. at 346.
296. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1)(A)). The statute of limitations for a
claim brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) is limited to two years. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2636(i) (1994).
297. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
298. Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 345.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 347 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
301. Id. at 348.
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observe wildlife, specifically endangered species like the sperm
whale.0 2
With regard to preliminary relief, the court held that the Humane
Society's complaint failed to satisfy the requirements for the "ex-
traordinary" relief of a preliminary injunction.3"3 With respect to
permanent relief, the court, in its August 1995 decision, held that
while the Humane Society may, "on final analysis," not be able to
prove standing, the court was unable to make that determination
"with only the complaint at hand. 30 4 On February 16, 1996, how-
ever, after discovery, further briefs, and a hearing, the court granted
the Humane Society's motion for summary judgment .3  Finding
that the Federal Defendants did not formally deny any of the facts
proffered by the Humane Society,3° the court reasoned that there
was no dispute as to the facts that would require a trial3 7 and
"that the controlling issues [were] legal., 3 1
The Federal Defendants argued that the court should issue sum-
mary judgment in their favor because "the agencies charged with
administration of the Driftnet Enforcement Act are entitled to sub-
stantial deference and that the Secretary of Commerce has not
abused his discretion in not identifying Italy, that is, that that deci-
sion is reasonable and supported by the record. '' 3' The court dis-
agreed310 and ruled that the documents submitted by the Federal
Defendants "give reason in the mind of an ordinarily intelligent
302. Id. at 341.
303. Id. at 348-49. Immediate relief, as sought by the Humane Society, re-
quired "(1) [a] threat of immediate irreparable harm; (2) that the public interest
would be better served by issuing than by denying the injunction; (3) a likelihood
of success on the merits; and (4) that the balance of hardship on the parties fa-
vor[s issuance]." Id. at 348 (quoting S.J. Stile Associates, Ltd. v. Snyder, 646
F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1981), and American Stevedoring Inc. v. U.S. Customs
Service, 852 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994)).
304. Humane Soc'y 1, 901 F. Supp. at 348.
305. Humane Soc'y 11, No. 95-05-00631, slip op. at 69. See also Thomas W.
Lippman, Italy Faces Cutoff of Exports to U.S.; Federal Court Rules Worldwide
Ban on Driftnets is Being Defied, WASH. POST, March 14, 1996, at A24.
306. Id. at 29, 59, 66.
307. Id. at 12.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 30.
310. Id. at 36.
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person to believe that Italians continue to engage in large-scale
driftnet fishing in the Mediterranean Sea in defiance of the law of
their own country and of the rest of the world."3 " ' The court
analogized the case to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,12 in
which the Supreme Court reasoned that "endangered species legis-
lation reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered
species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agen-
cies." '313 The court thus felt compelled to determine that the "iden-
tification of Italy under 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1)(B) has been un-
lawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed and also that the
Secretary's decision not to make such identification has been an
abuse of discretion" under the Administrative Procedure Act.1 4
The Federal Defendants further argued that the case should be
dismissed for lack of standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution.3 5 Defendants argued that under Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 316 "the controlling precedent,, 317 the Humane Society
did not fulfill any of the standing requirements.3 ' The court, on
the other hand, did not agree and found that the Humane Society
did indeed meet all requirements.3 9 Specifically, the court found
that the record before the court and before Congress demonstrated
that the type of enforcement provisions enacted by Congress "can
be and are effective in furtherance of underlying conservation poli-
cies.""32 Furermore, the court pointed out that it could not find
that plaintiff's standing was, as the Supreme Court stated in Lujan,
311. Id.
312. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
313. Humane Soc'y II, No. 95-05-00631, slip op. at 42 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S.
at 125).
314. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
315. Id. at 50-51. The Federal Defendants asserted that the Humane Society's
alleged harm was not imminent enough to show injury-in-fact, that they had not
proven actual harm, that the Federal Defendants' conduct did not cause plaintiffs'
injuries, and that their injuries were "not likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Id.
316. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
317. Humane Soc'y II, No. 95-05-00631, slip op. at 55 (quoting Defs.' Mem. at
32).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 55-69.
320. Id. at 67.
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within the range of "pure speculation and fantasy."32' The court
granted the Humane Society's motion for summary judgment.322
Thus, after only nine months of litigation in the CIT, the environ-
mental groups obtained a favorable decision on the merits, having
first met the stringent standing requirements under Lujan.323
C. Sea Turtles
After years of active litigation and following the dismissal of
their case in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals due to the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction,324 on June 7, 1994, Earth Island3" re-
filed the sea turtle case in the CIT.326 Earth Island alleged that
pursuant to... defective regulations, defendants have improperly
certified a number of nations in the wider Caribbean for the con-
tinued importation of shrimp and shrimp products. In addition,
defendants have improperly allowed the continued import of
shrimp and shrimp products from dozens of other nations which
the Secretary of Commerce has determined harvest shrimp with
commercial fishing technology that may adversely affect sea tur-
tles.327
321. Id. at 68 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 567).
322. Id. at 69. The court instructed the parties to "confer and present to the
court... a proposed form of final judgment in conformity with this opinion." Id.
The proposed form of final judgment was to be received by the court by March
15, 1996. Id.
323. The complaint was filed in May of 1995, and the decision was issued in
February of 1996.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 191-247.
325. This time, plaintiffs were: Earth Island Institute, Todd Steiner, the Ameri-
can Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("ASPCA"), the Humane
Society of the United States ("HSUS"), the Sierra Club, and the Georgia
Fishermen's Association, Inc. ("GFA") [collectively "Earth Island"].
326. Earth Island filed a Summons and Complaint, asking the court for declara-
tory judgment,see 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1994), review of
agency action, see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), mandamus, see 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1994), and injunctive relief. Complaint at 1 12, Earth Island Institute v. Christo-
pher, 890 F. Supp. 1085 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) [hereinafter Earth Island IV-l]
(resolving Federal Defendants' motion to dismiss). See also Earth Island Institute
v. Christopher, 94-06-00321, 1995 WL 779980 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter Earth Island IV-2] (resolving motions for summary judgment).
327. Complaint at 13 [ 31, Earth Island IV-], 890 F. Supp. 1085.
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Earth Island claimed that "defendants have improperly allowed the
continued import of shrimp and shrimp products from Brazil...
grant[ing] Brazil yet another extension of 6 months to come into
compliance with the sea turtle safety requirement.
328
Earth Island asked the CIT to issue a declaration "that defendants
have breached their statutory duties., 329 Earth Island further asked
the court to review defendants' "agency actions," alleging that these
actions were arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with the sea
turtle statute.330 Earth Island also alleged that the Federal Defen-
dants violated the Administrative Procedure Act,33' by adopting
regulations without giving the public the opportunity to review and
comment.332 In the third claim for relief, Earth Island asked for a
writ of mandamus "directed at defendants requiring them to per-
form the duties established by" the statute. 33 Finally, Earth Island
asked the court to
enjoin defendants from allowing the importation of shrimp and
shrimp products from any nation with commercial fishing opera-
tions which may adversely impact sea turtles unless and until the
Secretary of State determines and certifies ... that the foreign
nation has a current and enforceable sea turtle protection pro-
gram... and an incidental taking rate fully comparable to that of
the United States.334
Earth Island argued for equitable relief, since its injuries were "ir-
reparable" and money damages "incalculable and inadequate to
compensate for the continued depletion and threatened extinction of
sea turtle species which have existed on Earth for millions of
years. 335
The Federal Defendants336 filed a motion to dismiss all plain-
328. Id. at 13 q 32.
329. Id. at 141134.
330. Id. at 14 36.
331. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
332. Complaint at 14 f 37, Earth Island IV-2, 1995 WL 779980.
333. Id. at 14-15 W 39-40.
334. Id. at 16-17 917.
335. Id. at 15 f 42, 16-179 17.
336. The defendants were: Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of
the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
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tiffs except the Georgia Fishermen's Association, Inc. ("GFA"), and
to dismiss the case against the Secretary of Commerce and the
Assistant Administrator of the NMFS for "lack of standing to sue
or be sued." '337 The Federal Defendants argued that the environ-
mental plaintiffs lacked standing because their "allegations regard-
ing causation and redressability are based on predictive facts rather
than historical facts and as such must be evaluated with more ex-
acting scrutiny.""33 The Federal Defendants further argued that
Earth Island was required to "demonstrate that redressability is
'substantially likely,"'339 and that Earth Island did not make this
showing.3" Earth Island, on the other hand, argued that the only
allegations they had to make were that they "(1) suffered a personal
injury, (2) which is fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct, and (3) which is likely to be redressed by the
requested relief."34 Earth Island claimed that its complaint clearly
stated satisfactory facts to support standing.342
Judge Aquilino of the CIT, in his June 1995 decision, agreed
with Earth Island and dismissed the Federal Defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment.343 The court reasoned that because
"defendants' answer places in issue each and every averment as to
the named party plaintiffs," 3" plaintiffs' standing "is to be estab-
Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Elinor G. Constable,
Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries,
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), Rolland A. Schmitten, and the
National Fisheries Institute, Inc. ("NFI") [collectively "Federal Defendants"].
337. Earth Island IV-], 890 F. Supp. at 1087.
338. Federal Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Partial Motion to
Dismiss at 12, Earth Island IV-], 890 F. Supp. 1085.
339. Id. at 13 (quoting Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d
968, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1988), citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 748, 751
(1984)).
340. Id.
341. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Partial Motion to
Dismiss at 15, Earth Island IV-], 890 F. Supp. 1085 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
38 (1976)).
342. Id.
343. Earth Island IV-1, 890 F. Supp. 1085.
344. Id. at 1094.
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lished at trial or otherwise."345 The court also rejected the Federal
Defendants' argument that the case against the Secretary of Com-
merce and the Assistant Administrator of the NMFS should be
dismissed for lack of standing. While the Federal Defendants' "po-
sition [on why the action against two named defendants should be
dismissed] may prove well-founded after discovery and develop-
ment of all material facts .... the court is not at liberty to grant the
requested, summary relief based on the paucity of such facts al-
ready presented."3
Following a hearing and the renewed filing of briefs, the court
granted Earth Island's motion for summary judgment on December
29, 1995."47 The court began its opinion by pointing out that
"[sicience and government have apparently come to agree that the
turtles which have navigated Earth's oceans for millions of years
may not survive modem human habits (and appetites) without the
intervention of law." 3 As all parties agreed that no material is-
sues of fact were in dispute, the court proceeded to examine the
legal issues.349
The Federal Defendants argued that all plaintiffs should be dis-
missed for lack of standing.35 While the court found the GFA did
not meet the Lujan standing requirements because "[gleneral allega-
tions of economic disadvantage" were not sufficient,35' it ruled
that all the other plaintiffs did fulfill the Lujan criteria.35 2 Further-
345. Id. at 1095.
346. Id. at 1093.
347. Earth Island IV-2, 1995 WL 779980, at *20. See also Judge Says Law to
Save Turtles Prevents Most Imports of Shrimp, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at A9,
col. 1.
348. Earth Island IV-2, 1995 WL 779980, at *1.
349. Id. at *3.
350. Id. at *3-*4.
351. Id. at *4.
352. Id. at *5-*12. The Humane Society of the United States alleged, inter
alia, that it has "demonstrated a strong interest in preservation, enhancement, and
humane treatment of wildlife, particularly threatened and endangered species,
including sea turtles and marine mammals." Id. at *5. The Sierra Club alleged,
inter alia, that it was "committed to practicing and promoting the responsible use
of the Earth's ecosystems and resources." Id. The ASPCA alleged, inter alia, that
it "has been involved in the observation and/or study of sea turtles since 1867."
Id. at *6.
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more, the Federal Defendants contended that the action should be
dismissed because the statute of limitations had run.353 The court
held that while Earth Island never requested the transfer of the case
from the Ninth Circuit to the CIT,354 "the primary focus of this
case is, and must be, on the underlying statute, subsection (b)(2) of
which requires certification by the President not later than May 1
each annum."'355 Thus, the court ruled that the action was not
barred by the statute of limitations because it starts anew each
year.
356
The Federal Defendants also asserted "that section 609(b) is
silent on the geographic scope of its implementation and that
defendants' delimitation to the wider Caribbean is reasonable. 3 7
The court, however, disagreed and held that section 609 was clear
and unambiguous as to its scope. 358 The Federal Defendants fur-
ther contended that because Congress never amended the statute to
counteract the "longstanding administrative construction" it "acqui-
esced in th[e] limited approach and that the court should therefore
uphold it."'359 The court disagreed and found that the approach
that the agencies have taken "is not longstanding nor, according to
the record developed, has Congress revisited section 609. ' ' 6 The
court held that
[i]n the absence of such extended meaningful interaction between
the executive and legislative branches .... the critical, unrefuted
facts ... remain plaintiff Steiner's estimate that 124,000 sea tur-
tles continue to drown annually due to shrimping by countries
other than the United States, that Congress (and the President)
agreed on enactment of section 609 in an attempt to diminish the
Defendants conceded that Earth Island Institute and Todd Steiner suffered
injury, but limited this concession to a certain geographical area. Id. at *7. The
court, however, did not find a geographical limitation in the sea turtle law and
ruled that those two plaintiffs did indeed have standing regarding all geographic
areas in issue. Id. at *12.
353. Id. at *12-*13.
354. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
355. Earth Island IV-2, 1995 WL 779980, at *14 (emphasis added).
356. Id.
357. Id. at *15.
358. Id.
359. Id. at *18 (quoting Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974)).
360. Id.
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carnage, and that the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the
view that the plain intent of this kind of legislation is to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost, and
to give endangered species priority over the primary missions of
federal agencies.36'
The court, therefore, directed the Federal Defendants "to prohibit
not later than May 1, 1996 the importation of shrimp or products of
shrimp wherever harvested in the wild with commercial fishing
technology which may affect adversely [certain] species of sea tur-
tles . . . , and to report the results thereof to the court. 3 62 Earth
Island thus obtained a favorable judgment on the merits in only 18
months of litigation in the CIT, following years of fighting for the
protection of sea turtles in the federal courts in California.
CONCLUSION
Under basic principles of international law, the United States may
not, with few exceptions, impose its policies and laws on actions
taking place outside of its own territory. It nevertheless frequently
attempts to impose its own ideas of what is right and what is wrong
on other countries. This should, if at all necessary, preferably be
done through diplomatic intervention and the negotiation of treaties.
However, in many cases, the only way to attempt to change un-
wanted behavior by foreign subjects is to threaten and impose trade
barriers, in the hope that the "rogue" country will change its behav-
ior because of the fear of lost revenues.
International environmental issues are, therefore, often dealt with
through trade measures. An intricate system, set up by the United
States Congress, authorizes and directs a number of federal agen-
cies to commence negotiations, to investigate and certify countries
not in compliance with certain regulations, and to impose trade
embargoes if deemed necessary. Unfortunately, these agencies have
so far been dragging their feet. Few regulations have been imple-
mented, and often countries are only certified to be in violation of
U.S. law after environmentalists have sued the federal government.
361. Id. (referring to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185
(1978) and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Ore-
gon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2413 (1995)).
362. Id. at *20.
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The government, on the other hand, keeps coming up with new
reasons why it should not be sued over these issues. The govern-
ment has argued that the district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction, that the political question doctrine barred judicial review,
that there were statute of limitations bars, and, finally, that envi-
ronmental groups lacked standing to sue under the provisions in
question. It is incomprehensible why the Executive Branch is ex-
pending inordinate amounts of time and money on this kind of
litigation after the Congress has made absolutely clear that the
protection of dolphins, sea turtles, and other marine mammals, as
well as sea birds, is an extremely important interest of the United
States.
While Earth Island Institute and the other environmental groups
involved in the cases discussed in this Note initially argued against
the Court of International Trade as the proper forum for this kind
of environmental dispute, litigation in the CIT has so far been and
may continue to be a blessing in disguise for environmental groups
after all. The caseload of the judges at the CIT is apparently not as
overwhelming as that of many district judges in California and New
York, and the CIT judges keep a close reign on their cases, which,
in turn, leads to faster judicial resolution. Judge Aquilino of the
CIT, in particular, like Judge Henderson of the District Court for
the Northern District of California, has already developed a very
specialized expertise in this area of law. Because international envi-
ronmental law is so strongly intertwined with international trade,
the Court of International Trade is indeed the proper forum for
disputes involving environmental issues.
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